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Kant’s objection to the ontological argument, his famous claim that existence is not a “predicate or a determination of a thing” (2:72​[1]​), is one of his most influential doctrines.  Kant discusses, and rejects, the ontological argument in a number of texts, spanning most of his philosophical career.  He first gives the famous objection in 1763 in The Only Possible Ground of Proof in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God and repeats the same objection, in slightly different terminology, in both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason and afterwards.​[2]​   Kant’s objection to the ontological argument is not only of his most consistent views, it is also one of his most famous, and frequently endorsed.  Philosophers who would accept few if any of his other doctrines have found Kant’s objection to the ontological argument persuasive.​[3]​  This has only been strengthened by the fact that Kant anticipates the modern view that existence is a quantifier.​[4]​
	However, as both Kant scholars and other philosophers interested in the ontological argument have pointed out, it is not immediately clear what Kant means by claiming that “existence is not a predicate or a determination of a thing” (2:72) or that “being is not a real predicate” (A598/B626).  Nor is it clear how this constitutes an objection to the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for this claim.​[5]​ 
	Nor is it immediately clear what constitutes an ‘ontological’ argument.  Kant coined the term ‘ontological argument’ to refer to arguments for the existence of God like those given by Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten.​[6]​  However, the arguments offered by these philosophers differ significantly in their details.  Any interpretation of Kant’s objection to the ontological argument rests, therefore, on an interpretation of what makes these arguments ‘ontological’ in Kant’s sense.
	This paper aims to answer four inter-related questions:
(1)	What is an ontological argument (or proof) in Kant’s sense?
(2)	What does Kant mean by claiming that existence is not a determination?
(3)	How is this supposed to show that ontological arguments (in Kant’s sense) are impossible?

(4)	What is Kant’s argument that existence is not a determination?  Does this argument succeed?

The first two sections examine the first two questions.  I argue that an ontological argument, in Kant’s sense, is an argument according to which God’s existence is grounded in his essence.   I also argue that, by claiming that existence is not a determination, Kant is claiming that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects.  In the relevant sense of ‘determination,’ a determination is a concept such that it is possible for there to be an object that does not fall under that concept.  In the third section I argue that the claim that God’s existence is grounded in his essence – the distinctive claim of ontological arguments -- presupposes that, contra Kant, existence is a determination; if existence is not a determination, ontological arguments are impossible.  In the fourth section I argue, further, that the two main ontological arguments with which Kant engaged – those of Descartes and Leibniz – are implicitly committed to the claim that existence is a determination.  In section five I consider the motivation, both those available in the eighteenth century and in contemporary metaphysics, for taking existence to be a determination.  In the sixth, and final, section I examine Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason (henceforth, CPR) that existence is not a determination and conclude that they are effective against some, but not all, motivations for taking existence to be a determination.

1. What are ontological arguments?

Kant coined the now common term ‘ontological proof’ to characterize theistic arguments like those given by Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten and others.   Since ‘proof’ carries undesirable connotations of soundness, I will use the more neutral term ‘argument’ instead.  An ontological argument, for Kant, is an argument for the existence of God that purports to derive his existence from his mere possibility.​[7]​   In this sense, Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz all gave ontological arguments for God’s existence. The term ‘ontological argument’ comes from ‘ontotheology’ – another Kantian coinage – the part of theology that attempts to determine the attributes of God that follow a priori from his mere possibility.  The ontological argument is thus the characteristic ‘ontotheological’ way of proving God’s existence.   Consequently, I will refer to proponents of the ontological arguments as ‘ontotheists.’​[8]​ 
	It is crucial to understand that Kant’s objection to ontological arguments is not fundamentally an objection to them as arguments, but an objection to a metaphysical thesis they all (according to Kant) share, at least implicitly.  First, I will explain what this metaphysical thesis is, and then I will explain why it is Kant’s target.
	God exists necessarily.  This doctrine is shared by all of the ontotheists – Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, etc. – and at least by the pre-Critical Kant.  The Critical Kant admits at least the epistemic possibility that God exists necessarily, and in some texts appears to endorse his necessary existence.​[9]​ Consequently, the arguments of the CPR and Only Possible Ground – whatever they are supposed to show – are not intended to show that the idea of a necessary being is incoherent or that there is no such being.
	What Kant rejects is the ontotheological explanation of why God exists necessarily, if he does.  The ontotheists claim that God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that his essence grounds his existence.  In what follows I am going to abstract from the differences in Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten’s theories to describe a common strategy for explaining God’s necessary existence by grounding his existence in his essence.  This is an appropriate interpretive strategy because it is what Kant does: he abstracts from their differences to isolate a common ontotheist view about what explains God’s necessary existence, and attacks that very general view.  However, this interpretive strategy brings with it some of the same dangers that Kant’s method does.  To the extent that these various thinkers’ versions of the ontological argument depart significantly from the very general view Kant is directing his arguments against, to that extent Kant’s objection does not affect those thinkers.  I will argue, though, that even where these thinkers’ ontological arguments differ from Kant’s general model, their differences are not significant enough to undermine Kant’s objection.  Kant casts a wide net, and it captures the ‘official’ versions of the ontological argument in Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten.
The ontotheists share the very natural view that objects necessarily have certain properties in virtue of their essences.   Caesar has an essence, an essence which contains as a component the property humanity. The fact that Caesar’s essence has humanity as a part grounds the fact that Caesar is human; Caesar is human in virtue of the fact that humanity is part of his essence.​[10]​  But the essence of Caesar does not merely ground the properties that are constituents of his essence.  For instance, even if animality is not a part of Caesar’s essence, his essence still grounds his animality.  Since humanity logically entails animality, Caesar’s essence explains why he is an animal.  The properties grounded in Caesar’s essence include the properties that compose (are contained in) that essence as well as the properties that are logically entailed by those properties.  Thus, both humanity and animality are grounded in Caesar’s essence.   Caesar has other properties that are not grounded in his essence.  For instance, Caesar is a Roman.  Caesar’s essence does not explain why he is Roman; Caesar’s essence does not explain why he was born a Roman, rather than, say, a Greek.  The properties of Caesar that are not grounded in his essence are his accidental properties.​[11]​
	Caesar is necessarily human but only contingently Roman. What makes this so? Caesar’s essence grounds certain properties.   In virtue of the fact that Caesar’s essence grounds these properties, Caesar has them necessarily.  Caesar’s other properties, which are not entailed by his essence, are had only contingently.  Getting the structure of this explanation right will be important for later discussions.  We want to know what it is in virtue of which facts of the form
(1)	☐ (a is F).
obtain. Facts of the form (1) obtain in virtue of the obtaining of facts of the form 
(2)	Being F is contained in, or entailed by properties contained in, the essence of a.

Similarly,
(3)	☐(Caesar is a Roman citizen)
is false in virtue of the fact that being a Roman citizen is neither contained in, nor entailed by properties contained in, Caesar’s essence. This schema applies to all necessary and accidental properties of objects.   Necessary properties are grounded in (contained in, or entailed by, properties contained in) essences, and are necessary properties in virtue of being grounded (contained in, or entailed by, properties contained in) in essences.​[12]​
When I say that one property entails another, or that an essence entails or is (in)compatible with a property, this might strike some modern readers as incoherent, because we typically take logical relations like entailment to hold only between propositions or propositionally structured entities (sentences, judgments, etc.).  However, authors in this period do not typically observe this restriction; it is quite common to find Baumgarten, Wolff or Kant talking about concepts or properties entailing one another.​[13]​  However, the idiom of entailment relations between properties can be understood in terms of entailment relations between propositions: property P entails property Q just in case for any object x the proposition that x has P entails the proposition that x has Q.  Likewise, an essence E entails a property P just in case for any x the proposition that E is the essence of x entails that x has P.  Earlier I stipulated that an essence E grounds a property P just in case either P is a part of E, or P is entailed by properties that are parts of E.  This means that an essence E grounds a property P just in case either P is a part of E  or for any x the proposition that x has E entails the proposition that x has P.
	This is a set of views about the relation between essences, necessary properties and accidents that are shared by the ontotheists and, in some texts, Kant himself.​[14]​  What is distinctive of the ontotheists is that they extend this understanding of the relation between necessity and essence to the case of God’s necessary existence.  God exists necessarily, and Caesar exists only contingently.  What makes it the case that God exists necessarily?  God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that existence is grounded in his essence (either by being contained in it, or logically entailed by it).  God exists necessarily because his essence alone makes it the case that he exists.  Caesar exists contingently in virtue of the fact that he exists, but existence is not grounded in his essence.  Caesar exists contingently because his essence alone does not make it the case that he exists.​[15]​
	Kant’s objection to ontological arguments is that they presuppose the metaphysical view that God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that his existence is contained in or entailed by his essence.  Kant does not reject the claim that God exists necessarily; his objection is that if God exists necessarily, the ontotheists are wrong about why he exists necessarily.  This is important, because it shows that Kant’s objection to ontological arguments is not primarily an objection to them as arguments.   Kant’s primary claim is not that the premises of an ontological argument do not validly entail its conclusion, although his view does entail that. Nor is Kant making the epistemic point that ontological arguments fail to give sufficient reasons to accept that God exists, although he does also think that.  Kant’s claim is that ontological arguments presuppose a false metaphysical view about the source or ground of necessary existence.  Thus, it might be more accurate to say that Kant’s ultimate objection is not to ontological arguments per se but to the ontotheist view of why God exists necessarily. As Kant puts it succinctly in the Heinze lecture transcript, “God himself cannot know his own existence through concepts” (28:784).  Even God cannot know his own existence through concepts, because God’s existence is neither entailed by nor contained in his essence.
	In Only Possible Ground Kant writes:
That of which the opposite is impossible in itself is absolutely necessary.  This is certainly a correct nominal definition.  But if I ask: upon what does the absolute impossibility of the non-being of a thing depend? then what I am looking for is the real definition; this alone can serve our purpose. (2:81)

An object exists necessarily if and only if the non-existence of that object is impossible.  Kant is not rejecting this principle, but pointing out that it is not informative.  It is a nominal definition – it provides necessary and sufficient conditions for necessary existence – but it is not a real definition.​[16]​  I take it that Kant’s objection is that this definition is not explanatory: it does not tell us why a necessary being, if there is one, exists necessarily.  Immediately after this passage, Kant summarizes his objection to the ontological argument, and then writes:
The final reflection of this work will make all this more plausible; it will do so by clearly explaining the untenability of the view being examined in the case where it has been genuinely though mistakenly thought that absolutely necessary existence could be explained by means of the law of contradiction. (2:82)

“The view being examined” is the ontotheological view that God exists necessarily in virtue of his essence containing or entailing his existence.  This view explains God’s necessary existence via the law of non-contradiction because, on the ontotheist view, God’s existence is a logical consequence of his essence; if God did not exist, this would be a contradiction.​[17]​ 
Kant’s discussion of the ontological arguments in CPR does not begin as a criticism of them as arguments that God exists, but as explanations of why God exists necessarily.  In the immediately preceding section of the Ideal of Pure Reason, “The grounds of proof of speculative reason for inferring the existence of a highest being,” Kant describes reason as assuming the existence of an absolutely necessary being and then casting about for an explanation of why that being necessarily exists.  He first argues that reason has no grounds for regarding an unlimited being – one possessed of every reality – as a necessary being, and, conversely, no reason for rejecting limited beings as candidates for necessary existence.   His discussion of the ontological argument in section four, therefore, begins with reason already having formed the concept of a necessary being, and inferred (illegitimately) its existence.  He writes:
In all ages one has talked about the absolutely necessary being, but has taken trouble not so much to understand whether and how one could so much as think of a thing of this kind as rather to prove its existence.   Now a nominal definition of this concept is quite easy, namely that it is something whose non-being is impossible; but through this one becomes no wiser in regard to the conditions that make it necessary to regard the non-being of a thing as absolutely unthinkable, and that are really what one wants to know, namely whether or not through this concept we are thinking anything at all.  For by means of the word unconditional to reject all the conditions that the understanding always needs in order to regard something as necessary, is far from enough to make intelligible to myself whether though a concept of an unconditionally necessary being I am still thinking something or perhaps nothing at all. (A593/B621)

Here again we see Kant’s point from Only Possible Ground: aside from the question whether we have reason to infer the existence of a necessarily existing being, we do not yet have an informative answer to the question, assuming there were such a being, what would account for its necessary existence?  Again, he makes the point that the nominal definition of a necessary existent as a being whose non-existence is impossible does not answer the question.  What we want to know is whether, when we think of a necessarily existing being, ‘we are thinking anything at all’: we want to know what it would be for a being to exist necessarily, so that we can be confident that our concept of a necessary being is not a subtly incoherent one.  It is only after introducing this issue – assuming there is a necessarily existing being, what grounds its necessary existence? – that Kant explicitly discusses the ontological argument.  He does so because the primary importance of the ontological argument in this context is that it rests on a view about what explains necessary existence: God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that his essence grounds (contains or entails) his existence.​[18]​
In objecting to the ontological argument, Kant is primarily objecting to a metaphysical view about what grounds the necessary existence of a necessary being, if there is one.  He is not merely objecting to an argumentative strategy for establishing the truth of theism.  The importance of this difference can best be grasped by observing that a theist may consistently accept the ontotheist view that God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that his essence grounds his existence, but deny that this is the basis for a convincing argument for theism.  The theist might deny that this is the basis for a convincing argument because he might, quite plausibly, hold that one only has good reasons to accept that there is a divine essence, and that it contains existence, if one already accepts that there is a necessary being.  So the contemporary theist might hold that God’s essence is explanatorily prior to his existence, but that his existence is epistemically prior to his essence (i.e. we can only come to know his essence by first coming to know that he exists by some other means, perhaps the design argument).  To such a theist, Kant would object: the very idea of a being whose existence is grounded in its essence is incoherent. It is that Kantian claim, and Kant’s argument for it, that I want to examine in this paper.
I observed earlier that Kant is describing a very general model to which Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten fit to varying degrees.   Kant frequently describes the ontological argument as deriving God’s existence from his essence using only the principle of non-contradiction, which shows the influence of Leibniz upon his thinking about the argument.​[19]​  Consequently, his model fits Leibniz better than it fits Descartes.  It is tailor-made for Wolff and Baumgarten, because Kant’s conception of ontotheistic metaphysics is shaped by the textbooks from which he lectured on metaphysics and natural theology.​[20]​  It fits the published versions of Leibniz’s ontological argument equally well,​[21]​ although Leibniz’s unpublished notes show a much more complicated and sophisticated set of views about the ontological argument.​[22]​  However, even Leibniz’s most sophisticated views about the ontological argument either fit Kant’s model, or are not really ontological arguments in Kant’s sense, because they derive God’s existence from some version of the principle of sufficient reason.​[23]​  Descartes differs the most from Kant’s general model.  The difference is that Descartes’ ontological argument does not rely as heavily on logical relations as Kant thinks the argument must.
	Descartes often writes as though God’s existence belongs to, or is contained in, his essence, but sometimes as though God’s existence is identical to his essence.​[24]​  By itself, this is a superficial difference, because if God’s existence is identical to his essence, then surely existence is ‘contained in’ God’s essence, in the sense that is required for my interpretation.  More significantly, Descartes thinks that our awareness of the ‘involvement’ of existence in God’s essence is provided by clear and distinct perception, rather than logical analysis.   On this point, Kant follows Leibniz in thinking of the ontological argument as deriving God’s existence by logical analysis of his essence, not clear and distinct perception.  Descartes thinks that we can clearly and distinctly perceive the involvement of existence in God’s essence, where this perception does not consist in our awareness of any logical or deductive relation between claims about God’s essence and his existence.  However, Descartes also gives what he takes to be a valid syllogistic argument for that conclusion, for those too blinded by the senses to directly intuit the involvement of existence in God’s essence.​[25]​  Kant’s objection applies both to that argument and our putative direct intuition.
		
2.    What Does it Mean that ‘Existence is not a Determination’?


In Only Possible Ground Kant objects to the ontological argument that “existence is not a predicate or a determination of a thing” (2:72) and in the first Critique he writes that “being is obviously not a real predicate” (A598/B626).   In this section, I explain what I think these claims mean.  First of all, for Kant, ‘real predicate’ and ‘determination’ are synonymous; in Only Possible Ground, by denying that existence is a predicate, Kant is denying that it is a real predicate, while allowing that it is a logical predicate.  A logical predicate, for Kant, is any concept that can figure in a judgment, either as subject or as predicate.  So from the fact that there are existential judgments, judgments whose predicate is ‘exists,’ it follows immediately that ‘exists’ is a logical predicate.  So there is really one claim, expressed in two synonymous ways: existence is not a determination, and ‘exists’ is not a real predicate. 
However, it is not at all clear what Kant means by denying that existence is a “determination.”  On this point, his definition in the Critique is unhelpful: “the determination is a predicate, which goes beyond the concept of the subject and enlarges it.  It must therefore not be contained in the subject concept” (A598/B626).   On the standard way of interpreting this definition, a determination of an object is a ‘synthetic predicate,’ a predicate of the object which is not contained in its concept.  Equivalently, a determination of an object is a predicate of a synthetic judgment of that object.   However, as other commentators have pointed out, this interpretation commits Kant to the following inconsistent triad:
(1)	Existence is not a determination of any object, i.e. the predicate ‘exists’ is never a synthetic predicate of an object.

(2)	All existential judgments are synthetic.
(3)	If a judgment is synthetic, then its predicate is synthetic with respect to its subject.​[26]​

Since Kant repeatedly asserts (2) in this section of the Critique and (3) follows from the definition of a synthetic judgment, either the interpretation of determinations as ‘synthetic predicates’ is mistaken, or Kant contradicts himself with the space of a few paragraphs.
	I want to propose an alternate interpretation of Kant’s claim that existence is not a determination.​[27]​  According to the ‘synthetic predicate’ interpretation, when Kant writes that the determination “enlarges” the subject concept, all he means is that the determination is not one of the marks analytically contained in the subject-concept.  Thus, on this reading, any predicate in a synthetic judgment is a determination of the subject-concept.  But this is not the only sense in which a predicate might be said to “enlarge” the subject concept of a judgment.  A predicate might also enlarge a concept by enlarging its content and rendering that concept more determinate: by restricting the range of possible objects that might fall under the concept.  I propose the following interpretation of Kant’s definition of ‘determination’ at A598/B626:
A predicate P is a determination of a concept C if and only if it is possible that there is an object that instantiates C but not P and it is possible that there is an object that instantiates C and P.​[28]​

A predicate P is a determination if and only P is a determination of at least once concept. ​[29]​

A determination of a concept further determines that concept, in the sense of specifying the nature of the objects falling under the concept.  Scalene is a determination of the concept triangle, but having interior angles that sum to one hundred eighty degrees is not a determination of that concept.   It does not add any new specification to the concept triangle, even though it is not analytically contained in that concept.​[30]​    Thus, on my definition, all determinations are synthetic predicates, but not every synthetic predicate of an object is a determination. 
	Note that this preserves the most natural reading of the passage: “the determination is a predicate, which goes beyond the concept of the subject and enlarges it.  It must therefore not be contained in the subject concept [sie muß also nicht in ihm schon enthalten sein]” (A598/B626 – my emphasis).  On my reading, the second sentence is a consequence of the first, but is not identical to it: because a determination enlarges the subject concept in the sense of adding further content to it, the determination cannot be analytically contained in the subject-concept.  On the ‘synthetic predicate’ reading, the second sentence merely restates the first sentence.
	In addition to respecting the natural reading of this passage, this reading has at least three other clear advantages.  First, it allows us to escape the inconsistent triad of views: just because existence is not a determination of any subject-concept, it does not follow that existence is not a synthetic predicate.  This is because
(1)	For any concept C, necessarily anything that falls under C falls under exists; exists is not a determination.

is compatible with	
(2)	No judgments of the form C exists are analytic; existence is not a mark of any concept.​[31]​

The second advantage of this reading is that it allows us to explain why existence is not a determination: existence does not ‘enlarge’ or further specify any concept, because it is the concept that necessarily every object falls under.  If exists were a determination of some concept C it would follow that it is possible for there to be an object that fall under C but dies not exist; it would follow that it is possible for there to be non-existent objects.
(3)		This point is important enough to deserve further exploration.  The concept exists is a determination just in case there is some concept C such that:
(4)	◊x(Cx & exists(x))
From which it would follow that
(5)	◊x(exists(x))
If exists is a determination, it follows that it is possible for there to be an object that does not fall under exists, that is, it is possible for there to be a non-existent object.  But notice that, conversely, if (4) is true, it follows that exists is a determination; (4) entails that exists is a determination of the trivial concept ‘x=x,’ the concept under which all objects fall.  So existence is a determination if and only if (4) is true.
	The natural way of defining the predicate exists is by using the quantifier ‘’: 
(6)	exists(y) =def x (y=x)
Applying this to ‘exists’ in (4), we get:
(6) 		◊xy(y=x)
which is obviously false.  There cannot be an object such that there is no object to which it is identical.  But defining the predicate ‘exists’ using the quantifier ‘’– as we did in (5) –is equivalent to assuming that ‘exists’ is a not determination.  If we interpret ‘determination’ as I have argued we should, Kant’s claim that existence is not a determination, while not philosophically uncontroversial, is highly plausible.  It is equivalent to defining the existence predicate in the natural way.   
Finally, this reading explains another claim Kant makes about existence.  In the beginning of the Postulates of Empirical Thought, the section of the first Critique that discusses the modal categories, Kant writes: “The categories of modality have this peculiarity: they do not in the least as determinations of the object augment the concept to which they are ascribed as predicates”  (A219/B266).​[32]​  I take this to mean that existence [Dasein] – which Kant often uses interchangeably with actuality [Wirklichkeit] as the second category of modality​[33]​ -- adds nothing to the content of a concept.  The concept existing unicorn and unicorn have exactly the same content, because necessarily all and only the same objects fall under them. Kant’s point is that we cannot coherently distinguish among objects those that are existent and those that are merely possible but nonexistent; all objects exist.   The meaning of Kant’s claim that existence is not a determination is the intuitive idea that, since existence applies to every object, it does not distinguish some objects from other objects.  It is the predicate that applies to everything there is.​[34]​  
There are passages in which Kant uses ‘determination’ in a different sense.  However, none of these passages occur in contexts in which Kant is discussing ontological arguments, existence/actuality, or the other modal categories (possibility, necessity).  I think that in those passages Kant is using ‘determination’ in a broader sense to mean any predicate whatsoever, rather than specifically a ‘real predicate.’​[35]​  Thus, my claims about the meaning of ‘determination’ should be understood as appropriately restricted: they are claims about the meaning of ‘determination’ in Kant’s claim that existence is not a determination.
Finally, I want to make clear that by attributing to Kant the view that all objects exist, or, equivalently -- given Kant’s equation of actuality with existence -- that there are no non-actual merely possible objects, I am not attributing to him the necessitarian position that all truths are necessary, or, equivalently, that there are no non-actualized possibilities.  This point is perhaps easiest to appreciate by translating Kant’s claim into modal logic:
(1) 	☐(x)(Actual(x))
Contrast this with the necessitarian claim that:
(2) 	Actually(p)  ☐p
Kant’s claim (1) is a claim about actuality understood as a predicate of objects: it is the claim that it necessarily applies to all objects whatsoever, that it is not a ‘real predicate’ or determination that potentially applies only to some subset of objects.  Claim (2) is about actuality understood as a sentential or propositional operator: it says that all propositions that are actually true are necessarily true.  There is no route from (1) to (2); Kant can consistently hold (1) while denying the necessitarian consequences of (2).   A complete account of Kant’s modal theory would involve accounting for his understanding of modal concepts as predicates of objects, and of modal concepts as predicates of sentences/propositions; I think both notions are at work in Kant’s modal theory, but I do not have space to explore them fully here.

3. Ontotheists are Committed to the Claim that Existence is a Determination

In this section, I am going to argue that the ontotheist is committed to holding existence is a determination, in the sense articulated in the previous section.  Earlier I showed that existence is a determination in Kant’s sense if and only if it possible that there are objects that do not exist, i.e.
(1)	◊xexists(x)
I will be arguing that ontotheists are committed to the truth of (1).
	Recall from section two that ontotheism is the view that God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that his existence is grounded in his essence.  In other words, the central ontotheist commitment is the following in-virtue-of claim:
(2)	(☐God exists) in virtue of the fact that (God’s existence is grounded in his essence).

This is an instance of the general principle that objects have properties necessarily in virtue of those properties being grounded in their essence.  It entails that
(3)	a’s essence grounds a’s being F  ☐(a is F).
In other words, any property grounded in an object’s essence is a property the object necessarily has.  Furthermore, the consequent of this conditional obtains in virtue of the antecedent; the object in question necessarily has the property because that property is grounded in its essence.
(4)		However, this conception of the relation between necessary properties and essence runs into problems if we make the assumption that existence is not a determination, i.e.
(5)	☐(x)(exists(x))
Assuming that existence is not a determination, (3) entails 
(6)	a’s essence grounds a’s being F  ☐ (a exists).
In other words, any object with an essence sufficient to ground some of that object’s properties is an object that necessarily exists.   This entails that either no object other than God has an essence, or that every object with an essence necessarily exists.  Neither is an acceptable consequence.
	The ontotheist might try to escape this consequence by modifying (3) as follows:
(7)	a’s essence grounds a’s being F  ☐(a exists  a is F).
But notice that the consequent of this conditional is trivial where ‘exists’ replaces ‘F’:
(6*)	a’s essence grounds a’s existence  ☐(a exists  a exists).
The triviality of this conditional undermines the ontotheist’s position.  The ontotheist view, after all, is that the antecedent of this conditional explains the consequent; this conditional is a consequence of (2) from above.  If the consequent of the conditional is trivial, then the antecedent of the conditional is doing no explanatory work.  The consequence of accepting (6) is a trivialization of the ontotheist view that God necessarily exists in virtue of his existence being grounded in his essence.
	In order to counter these problems, the ontotheist needs to retreat to (3) and reject the principle that existence is not a determination.  Recall
(3) 	a’s essence grounds a’s being F  ☐(a is F).
and the example from section two,
(8)	Caesar’s essence grounds Caesar’s being male
from which it follows that
(9)	☐(Caesar is male).
The ontotheist needs to understand (9) in a way that does not entail that it is necessary that Caesar exists, that is, the ontotheist needs to interpret (9) so that it is consistent with
(10) 	◊¬exists(Caesar)
(9)	Claim (9) is the claim that in any counterfactual situation (or ‘possible world’) Caesar is male; claim (10) is the claim that in some counterfactual situation (or ‘possible world’) Caesar does not exist.​[36]​  What the ontotheist needs in order to make these consistent is a distinction between an object having properties in a counterfactual situation and that object existing in that counterfactual situation.   This will involve distinguishing, in each counterfactual situation, the objects that are merely the subject-matter of true propositions in that counterfactual situation, and the objects that exist in that situation.  Accepting (3) means accepting the consequence that every object has its essential properties in every counterfactual situation, but this does not require embracing the conclusion that every such object exists in every counterfactual situation.​[37]​  In other words, the ontotheist needs to accept that
(10)	◊(Fa & ¬exists(a))
for some objects a.  In general, where a is a being that does not necessarily exist, but has an essence that grounds its possession of property F, it will follow that a has F in every counterfactual situation, even ones where it does not exist.  Of course, this requires accepting the view that existence is a determination, that is, that
(10) 	◊x(exists(x))
Ontotheism is committed to embracing precisely the claim that Kant rejects.​[38]​
	In the previous section I pointed out that the claim that existence is not a determination is equivalent to defining the predicate ‘exists’ in the natural way:
(11)	exists(x) =def y (y=x)
Given the inter-definability of the quantifiers, this is equivalent to
(12)	exists(x) =def y(y=x)
What my discussion so far brings out is that the ontotheist needs to deny (11) and (12) and claim that existence is not equivalent to falling within the domain of the universal quantifier.  The ontotheist needs to understand ‘exists’ as a predicate that (potentially) applies to only a subset of the object that fall within the domain of the universal quantifier.  Consequently, the ontotheist should not think of the quantifier ‘’ – defined in the standard way in terms of the universal quantifier – as the existential quantifier, but as a broader quantifier that includes not only existing objects but (potentially) non-existent objects as well.  The ontotheist might think of this quantifier as expressing the natural language quantifier expression ‘there is’ [es gibt] (that is why I have refrained from calling ‘’ the ‘existential’ quantifier).  After all, the ontotheist view is that there could be objects that do not exist.  It is important to point out that the ontotheist does not need to claim there are non-existent objects, but only that such objects are possible. But this is equivalent to claiming that existence is a determination.
	It might be objected that the ontotheist can do the same work by distinguishing between the objects that are actual and the objects that are not, while maintinaing that, necessarily, all objects (both actual and non-actual) exist.​[39]​   On such a view, objects can have properties (e.g. those contained in their essences) in counter-factual situations in which they are not actual.  In contemporary metaphysics, the view that there are objects that are not actual is called ‘possibilism.’  However, this is not a viable option for Kant, because he identifies existence [Dasein] and actuality [Wirklichkeit].​[40]​  Kant may have been simply following standard usage in German philosophy at the time.  In his Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie, which Kant sometimes lectured from, Eberhard’s list of recent proofs of the existence of God seems to use ‘Dasein’ and ‘Wirklichkeit’ interchangeably (18:563); Baumgarten also identifies ‘actualitas’ and ‘existentia’ in Metaphysica §55 (17:38).  Consequently, I’m going to treat existence and actuality as equivalent.  Commitment to non-existent objects is equivalent to commitment to non-actual possibilia.  Consequently, the ontotheist is committed to a possibilist ontology.
	So far I’ve argued that by denying that existence is a determination, Kant is denying that there could be objects that do not exist. I’ve also argued that the ontotheist, in order to make sense of the claim that God necessarily exists in virtue of his existence being grounded in his essence, needs to accept that there are, or could be, objects that do not exist.    In the next section, I argue that the two versions of the ontological argument that were most influential for Kant – those of Descartes and Leibniz – are implicitly committed to the claim that there are objects that do not actually exist.

4. Descartes and Leibniz are Committed to the Claim that Existence is a Determination

In the previous section I argued that the ontotheist is committed to holding that existence is a determination.  This argument was quite abstract, and might leave some readers wondering whether actual ontotheists make this assumption.  When Kant criticizes the ontological argument, he primarily has in mind the version given by Descartes in the Fifth Meditation, and its modifications by Leibniz and others.  In this section I argue that close attention shows that both Leibniz’s and Descartes’ arguments commit them to holding that existence is a determination.  Although both Descartes and Leibniz adopt other views in modal metaphysics that are in tension with this claim, their ontological arguments require it.  Consequently, Kant is right to think that their ontological arguments stand or fall with the issue of whether existence is a determination.
	Descartes presents his ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation, but for our purposes the clearest statement of the argument occurs in the first set of Replies:
[1]	“That which we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the true and immutable nature, or essence or form of something, can truly be asserted of that thing. 

[2] 	But once we have made a sufficiently careful investigation  of what God is, we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable nature. 

[3] 	Hence we can now truly assert of God that he does exist.”​[41]​ 

The logical form of this argument can be rendered more perspicuously as:

(1)	(e)(o)(p)(e is the essence of o & we clearly and distinctly understand that p belongs to e .   p can be truly asserted of o)

(2)	e(e is the essence of God & we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to e)

(3)	 Existence can be truly asserted of God.





In other words, unless ‘God’ in (2) is a constant (a value of a variable), the argument is invalid.  But this means that either the argument needs to quantify over objects that are not thereby assumed to exist, or it is immediately question-begging.  For if every object in the range of the quantifier ‘there is’ is an existing object it is immediately question-begging for Descartes to say that “once we have made a sufficiently careful investigation  of what God is, we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable nature.”  If some essence is the essence of God, then there is an object of which that essence is the essence, i.e., some object is God.   But by assuming that some essence is the essence of God, Descartes is not thereby assuming that God exists.  So he is committed to there being objects that may or may not exist, although they do have essences.
	Some readers might object that I have mischaracterized the logical form of this argument. To speak of the essence of God, goes the objection, is only to commit oneself to there being an essence, but not to commit oneself to there being an object of which this essence is the essence.  So the expression ‘e is the essence of God’ should not be read as asserting a relation R between e and God.   To say that ‘e is the essence of God’ is to say that e is an essence and that if there is a God, e is the essence of God.
	While that may be an independently defensible view of the expression ‘e is the essence of God,’ it fails to make Descarets’s argument valid.  It fails to make the argument valid because the first premise says that if we clearly and distinctly understand that some property belongs to the true and immutable nature of an object, that property belongs to the object, not to the essence itself.  This means that Descartes needs the relational reading of ‘e is the essence of God.’  If we take the non-relational reading of ‘e is the essence of God’ then Descartes needs to get from the claim that there is a divince essence that we clearly and distinctly understand to involve existence to the claim that there is something that has that essence.  In other words, he needs to prove that there is a God (an object with that divine essence).  But either that is equivalent to proving that God exists (in which case the ontological argument is pointless, because it requires its own conclusion as a premise), or it is not equivalent because there are or might be objects that do not exist.  But the whole point of resisting the ‘relational’ reading of ‘x is the essence of God’ was to resist the claim that Descartes’s argument commits him to non-existent objects.  Either Descartes’s argument is an obvious failure, or it commits him to the claim that existence is a determination.​[42]​
	It might be thought that this renders Descartes’s version of the ontological argument pointless, for in order to prove that God exists he first needs to prove that there is a God.  If premise (2) of the argument presupposes that there is God (i.e. there is an object of which the divine essence is the essence), what justification could Descartes give for that premise, other than simply another ontological argument?  We can think of the presuppositions of premise (2) as the conclusion of the following line of reasoning:
(i)	I clearly and distinctly understand the idea of God.

(ii)	For any idea I clearly and distinctly understand, it is possible that there is an object with an essence that is the object of my idea.

(iii)	If it is possible that there is an object that with an essence that is the object of my idea, then there is a possible object with an essence that is the object of my idea.

(C )	There is a God and God has an essence.

Descartes takes himself to have established premise (i) in the Third Meditation; it, together with the rule of clear and distinct perception, constitutes the fundamental basis for the argument of the Fifth Meditation.  Descartes explicitly states premise (ii) in response to Caterus’ question about how he knows that God is possible.​[43]​  Premise (iii) expresses a fundamental motivation for allowing non-actual objects into one’s ontology: they serve as truth-makers for modal claims.  While this principle is by no means uncontroversial, there are good reasons in support of it.  If I clearly and distinctly understand some essence, but no actually existing thing possibly has that essence, what could make it true that it is possible for there to be an object with that essence?  By hypothesis, nothing about actually existing objects or their essences.  Surely, it is possible for there to be an object with such an essence, this must be because of fact involving that essence.   So there must be such an essence.  But then it is not a far stretch to think that there must be an object of which that object is the essence, especially if we are thinking of essences as properties or modes of the very the objects of which they are essences (e.g. the property of being that very object). Fully developing this line of thought, though, is outside the scope of this paper.
	For present purposes it suffices to point out that, taken together, Descartes’ ontological argument is far from pointless, or obviously misguided.  It allows us to go from the possibility that there is a God to the claim that there is a possible God and this God has all of his essential properties, to the conclusion that God actually exists.  There are many places at which it is subject to attack; for instance, both Leibniz and Kant find Descartes’ proof that it is possible that there is a God inadequate.  But what my reconstruction brings out is that this argument stands or falls with the assumption that existence is a determination.  If we assumed instead that every object actually exists, then we would need to deny premise (iii) and resist the inference from the claim that possibly there is a God to the claim that there is a possible object that is God and has the properties contained in God’s essence.
	It is even clearer that Leibniz is committed to existence being a determination, at least in the published version of his ontological argument.  In “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas,” a text well-known to 18th century readers, he writes:
But since we are content with this blind thinking and don't pursue the resolution of notions far enough, it happens that a contradiction that might be included in a very complex notion is concealed from us. An argument for the existence of God, celebrated among the Scholastics long ago and revived by Descartes, once led me to consider this point more distinctly. The argument goes: whatever follows from the idea or definition of anything can be predicated of that thing. Since the most perfect being includes all perfections, among which is existence, existence follows from the idea of God (or the idea of the most perfect being, or the idea of that than which nothing greater can be thought). Therefore existence can be predicated of God. But one must realize that from this argument we can conclude only that, if God is possible, then it follows that he exists.​[44]​

Leibniz thinks that Descartes has only proven the conditional claim that if God is possible, then he exists because the principle that whatever belongs to the essence of a thing can be predicated of that thing only applies to possible things.  Additionally, Leibniz does not base his argument upon Cartesian clear and distinct perception, but on logical analysis of the essence.  So we should modify Descartes’s argument accordingly:
(1)	(e)(o)(p)(e is the essence of o & o is possible & p is logically contained in e   p can be truly asserted of e)

(2)	e(e is the essence of God & God is possible & existence is logically contained in e)

(3)	 God is possible  existence can be truly asserted of God.

Of course this argument needs to be supplemented with a proof that God is possible, but for this paper I am focusing on the inference from the claim that God is possible to the claim that he exists.​[45]​  Notice, though, that the argument, as formulated, is committed to there being non-existing objects just as much as Descartes’s argument is.  Otherwise, claiming that God is possible would be tantamount to claiming that God exists.  The argument would be immediately question-begging.
	Again, I might be suspected of misrepresenting the logical form of Leibniz’s argument.  It might be objected that ‘possible’ should not be read as a predicate of objects (as I have done) but a sentential operator (like ‘◊’ in contemporary modal logic); the claim ‘God is possible’ should not be read as predicating a property of an object, God, but as saying ‘possibly, there is a God.’  While this may be independently plausible as an account of the predicate ‘possible,’ it renders Leibniz’s argument immediately and obviously invalid.  Its premises would have to be formulated as:
(1*)  	(e)(F) (e is the essence of being God & ◊xGod(x) & being F is contained in e   (y)(God(y) Fy)) 

(2*) 	e(e is the essence of being God & existence is contained in e)

From which it follows only that:

(3*) 	◊xGod(x)   (y)(God(y)  Exists(y)) 

Even if Leibniz can prove that it is possible that there is a God, he would be left with the consequent,
(4)	 (y)(God(y) Exists(y)) 

Reinterpreting ‘possibility’ as a sentential operator does not help Leibniz do without the view that existence/actuality is a determination.   For in order to prove that God exists, he must first prove that there is a God.  If existence is a determination, these are the same claims, and the ontological argument is pointless.  However, if existence is not a determination and there are possible objects that are not existent/actual, the ontological argument allows Leibniz to reason from the claim that there is a possible object that is God to the claim that God actually exists.  But the point of introducing the sentential operator ‘◊’ in place of the predicate possible was to avoid commitment to objects that do not actually exist.  So Leibniz’s argument either presupposes that existence is a determination, or it is pointless. 
	In the second version of Leibniz’s argument, above, the conclusion was:
(4) 	 (y)(God(y) Exists(y))

(5)	In order to derive the desired conclusion that God exists from (4) , Leibniz would need to prove ‘yGod(y).’  This conclusion would be guaranteed by the following principle:
(6)	◊x(God(x))   x◊(God(x))​[46]​
The desired conclusion, that there exists a God, would follow if we assumed, plausibly, that no object other than God is possibly God.  Principle (5) says that if it is possible for there to be something that is God, then there is something that is possibly God.  It is precisely the same principle that we saw above could support Descartes’s introduction of God as an object: if it is possible for there to be an object with an essence I clearly and distinctly understand, then there is an object with that essence.  What this shows is that ontological arguments are by no means pointless in proving the existence of God.  They allow us to go from the claim that there is a God to the claim that God exists.   But in order to get to the claim that there is a God, they need to introduce God as a subject of singular predication, or, in contemporary terms, a value of a variable bound by an existential quantifier.   The natural path to this, I’ve been arguing, is to adopt some principle like (5) or (iii) from above – if it is possible for there to be something with a certain essence, then there is something with that essence, either an actually existing object or a mere possibile.  This is related to the complicated issue of the motivation for holding that existence is a determination, i.e. for allowing non-actual possibilia into one’s ontology.
	This is the appropriate place to address an objection to my interpretation of Kant that will no doubt have occurred to some readers.  Kant’s claim that the modal categories, including existence, “do not in the least, as determinations of the object, augment the concept to which they are ascribed as predicates” as well as his claim in Only Possible Ground that “when existence occurs as a predicate in common speech, it is a predicate not so much of the thing itself as of the thought which one has of the thing” (2:72-3) might lead one to think that the point of Kant’s distinction between logical and real predicates, or between predicates that express determinations and those that do not, is merely that the logical predicate ‘exists’ is a predicate of concepts, rather than of objects.  It is a forerunner of the modern quantificational theory of existence and Frege’s idea that existence is a second-order concept that applies only to first-order concepts of objects (it is the predicate that applies to all and only the concepts that are instantiated).​[47]​  I raise this objection now, rather than earlier, because my discussion of ontological arguments shows that these arguments need to use ‘exists’ (or ‘is actual’) as a predicate of objects.  If ‘exists’ is only ever a quantifier expression, thus only ever a predicate of concepts, then these arguments cannot be coherently formulated.  So, it might be thought, the ‘quantificational’ interpretation -- on which a ‘real predicate’ is just a predicate that applies to objects, rather than to concepts -- delivers a strong Kantian objection to ontological arguments as such.​[48]​
This line of thought, and the fact that Kant does anticipate the modern quantificational theory of existence,​[49]​ accounts for the popularity that the quantificational interpretation has enjoyed among commentators.  However, Kant’s objection, on the quantificational interpretation, is not nearly as strong as it might seem.  The ontotheist can admit that ‘exists’ is a quantifier (or second-order predicate) but deny that the domain of this quantifier is absolutely every object whatsoever; the ontotheist can claim that there is a wider quantifier ‘there is’ that ranges over the objects in the domain of the existential quantifier and other (merely possible) objects as well.  Thus the ontotheist can follow Kant in analyzing existential judgments as follows:
(1)	Fs exist =def ExFx
where ‘Ex’ is a quantifier expression whose bound variable takes only existing objects as values. The ontotheist can then claim that there is another quantifier with a wider domain, symbolized as ‘x,’ so that
(2)	There are Fs = xFx
and, consequently, judgments of the form of (2) do not entail judgments of the form of (1). The ontotheist can go one step further, defining ‘exists’ as a predicate:
(3)	Exists(x) = Ey(y=x)
and interpreting the predicate ‘exists’ (or ‘is actual’) in the arguments given earlier as this predicate, which is a first-order predicate of objects.​[50]​  This shows that the issue between the ontotheist and Kant is not fundamentally over whether ‘exists’ is a quantifier or a first-order predicate of objects.  The fundamental issue between the ontotheist and Kant is whether there are (or could be) objects to which the predicate exists (whether or not this is defined in terms of a quantifier) does not apply.  This issue can be expressed using the predicate exists (as I have just done) or using only quantifiers:  whether there is a quantifier with a wider domain than the existential quantifier ‘there exists.’

5. Why Think That Existence is a Determination?

The question of the motivation for possibilism – for accepting that existence/actuality is a determination -- in the eighteenth century is complicated.  I have shown that two of the main targets of Kant’s arguments – Descartes and Leibniz – are committed to holding that existence is a determination in their ontological arguments.  However, in other texts, Descartes appears to deny that there are non-existent objects.​[51]​  Similarly, in many texts Leibniz either rejects non-actual possibilia, or accepts them in a form that cannot be used to support the ontological argument.​[52]​  From one point of view, then, Kant can mount an effective tu quoque against the ontotheists: he has correctly shown that ontotheism brings with it a commitment that its proponents are not willing to endorse outside of the context of the ontological argument itself. 
	But the interesting philosophical question is not whether outside the context of the ontological argument the ontotheists were willing to endorse the claim that existence is a determination; the interesting philosophical question is whether there are good reasons to view existence as a determination.  If there are good philosophical reasons to endorse the view that existence/actuality is a determination, then, whether or not those reasons were available to the ontotheists in question, Kant has not effectively undermined ontotheism.
	The most obvious motivation for positing non-actual possibilia is that they make possible ontological arguments and the ontotheist explanation of divine necessity.  But if this were the only motivation for possibilism, the ontotheist is indirectly begging the question. I think we should look deeper for a motivation for possibilism.  The other natural motivation for possibilism, at least in Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten, is the doctrine that God chooses to create the actual world because it is the most perfect of all possible worlds.  This leads naturally to the thought that all of those other possible worlds, and the individuals that would have been actual if those worlds had been created, are possible but non-actual objects.  The contemporary analogue of this motivation is the influential possible worlds semantics for modal claims.  If, in making claims with the operator ‘possibly’ we are quantifying over possible worlds, and at some possible worlds there exist non-actual (or ‘alien’) objects, then, it might be thought, in making modal claims we are quantifying over alien objects. The possible world semantics apparently leads naturally to an ontology of possibilia.​[53]​
However there are both philosophical and historical reasons to be dissatisfied with this motivation for possibilism.   First of all, it is well understood in contemporary metaphysics that actualism is compatible with some forms of the possible worlds analysis of modality.   Possible worlds can be identified with actually existing objects, for instance, maximal consistent sets of (actually existing) propositions or (actually existing) sentences, or (actually existing but non-obtaining) maximal states-of-affairs.  Furthermore, the validity of the inference from the claim that there is a world w and if w were actual, there would exist an alien individual y, to the claim that there is an alien individual y can be questioned.  For instance, worlds that represent possibilies involving non-actual objects can be thought of as sets of propositions or sentences or some other kind of representation that represent those possibilites by quantifying over the non-actual objects;  since, by hypothesis, these non-actual possible worlds are not true (propositions, sentences) or do not obtain (states-of-affairs), the actualist can consistently deny that there are any any such non-actual objects.   Possibilities for non-actual objects do not need to be represented by singular propositions that have those non-actual objects as constituents.   They can be represented generically through quantifiers.​[54]​
To put this in terms more appropriate to eighteenth century metaphysics, if we think of possible worlds as ideas in God’s mind, we do not need to posit non-actual objects.   God’s idea of some alternate possible world he could have created may represent that world as containing individuals that do not actually exist, but it might represent them generically; it need not be that there is some non-actual possible object of which God’s idea represents some possibility.  The picture of God as choosing among various possible worlds which one to actualize brings with it no commitment to non-actual possibilia.​[55]​
However, the eighteenth century picture of God choosing among various possible worlds – and its analogue in possible worlds semantics​[56]​ – does provide some reasons in favor of a possibilist ontology.  Consider the story of Theodorus from Leibniz’s Theodicy.  Theodorus falls asleep in the temple of Pallas Athena, where he has a dream of the goddess guiding him through a magnificient palace.  She says:
You see here the palace of the fates, where I keep watch and word.  Here are representations not only of that which happens, but all of that which is possible.  Jupiter, having surveyed them before the beginning of the existing world, classified the possibilities into worlds, and chose the best of all. [. . .] I have only to speak and we shall see a whole world that my father might have produced, wherein will be represented anything that can be asked of him; and in this way one may know also what would happen if any particular possibility should attain unto existence.  [. . .] Thus you can picture to yourself an ordered succession of worlds, which shall contain each and every one the case that is in question, and shall very its circumstances and its consequences.  But if you put a case that differs from the actual world only in one single definite thing and in its results, a certain one of those determinate worlds will answer you.  These worlds are all here, that is, in ideas.  I will show you some, wherein shall be found, not absolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, he carries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextuses resembling him [. . .] You will find in one world a very happy and noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms.​[57]​

The goddess goes on to show Theodorus several such possible worlds, one in which the Sextus of that world becomes a rich man, one in which he marries the daugher of the king of Thrace, and so on.
	Consider one of the non-actual worlds.  If that world were actual, a certain Sextus would have existed.  Would that Sextus also have existed if a different non-actual world had been actualized?  The point is that if God actualized a world other than the actual world, there would exist different individuals, and there would be facts about which of those individuals would have existed if God had actualized other non-actual worlds.  To put the point formally, take non-actual worlds w and w*.  From the Theodicy it is clear that for some w and w* it is true that
(1) 	(w is actual  !x Sextus(x)) & (w* is actual  !x Sextus(x))
Now the question is, which of the following is true?
(2) 	(w is actual)  (!x Sextus(x) & (w* is actual  !y Sextus(y) & y=x))
(3) 	(w is actual)  (!x Sextus(x) & (w* is actual  !y Sextus(y) & yx))
where  expresses the counterfactual ‘would’ conditional and ‘!x’ expresses the quantifier ‘there is a unique x such that.’​[58]​ Intuitively, (2) says that the Sextus that would exist if w were actual is the same Sextus that would exist if w* were actual; intuitively, (3) says they are distinct.  But this is not strictly speaking right, because the quantifiers in (2) and (3) occur within the scope of counterfactuals. Strictly speaking, what (2) says is that if w were actual there would exist a Sextus who would also exist and be the unique Sextus if w* were actual; (3) says that if w were actual there would exist a Sextus who would not be identical to the object that would be Sextus if w* were actual.
Leibniz, as is well known, thought that (3) is true.  This is his famous doctrine of ‘counterfactual non-identity.’​[59]​  But the question of whether (2) or (3) is true applies to any philosopher who takes seriously the possible worlds picture (e.g. Wolff and Baumgarten), as does the question, which ever is true, what makes it true?   Leibniz, after all, must face the question: in virtue of what is (3) true and (2) false?  To put this in the terms of Leibniz’s metaphysics, that (3) is true means that God’s ideas of the Sextus in w and his ideas of the Sextus in w* are not ideas of the same object; if the former were actualized, a different individual would exist than would exist if the latter were actualized.   What grounds this fact?  One answer would be that this fact is primitive; God’s ideas of individuals in different possible worlds are ideas of distinct objects and there is no explanation of this fact.   Leibniz the rationalist would find this a very unappealing answer.​[60]​  A very natural and elegant answer is that God’s idea of the Sextus in w is an idea of a particular object and God’s idea of the Sextus w* is an idea of a particular object, and what makes (3) (or (2)) true is simply the fact that these objects are distinct (or identical).  But this requires that there are non-actual possibilia which are the objects of God’s ideas of the individuals that would inhabit non-actual possible worlds.  Leibniz may have an account of what makes (3) true that does not appeal to non-actual possibilia, but it is not clear what that account is.​[61]​ Furthermore, the appeal of the ‘possibilia’ answer is even greater if you depart from Leibniz’s counterfactual non-identity doctrine and allow that (2) might be true for some pairs of worlds w and w*.  The question then is, what grounds identity across counter-factual contexts?  One natural and elegant answer is that there are non-actual individuals that are constituents of (ideas of) possible worlds that represent them as existing, and that facts about identity ‘across’ possible worlds just consist in facts of identity among these objects. 
	I’ve argued that an eighteenth century philosopher who shares the general Leibnizian picture of God choosing among possible worlds faces significant pressure to admit non-actual possibilia in order to ground facts about counterfactual identity and non-identity.  Leibniz may have some solution to this problem that dispenses with possibilia, but determining exactly what that view is lies outside the scope of this paper.  Finally, I want to point out that this problem is precisely analogous to the contemporary problem of iterated modalities.​[62]​ Assume for the sake of argument that no actually existing object is possibly a child of Kant (for essentiality of origin reasons, say).   But Kant could have had a child who was not a philosopher but who could have been a philosopher.  More formally,
(1) 	◊x(C(x,Kant) & Px & ◊Px)
This is called the problem of iterated modalities because the second modal operator occurs within the scope of the first; (1) says that it is possible there is a non-philosopher child of Kant who is possibly a philosopher.  Applying the possible worlds semantics, (1) is true just in case there is a world w where there is an object x that is a non-philosopher child of Kant in w and in some possible world w*, x  is a philosopher.  The problem is, how do possible worlds represent possibilities about x?  If the child of Kant in w were an object x that actually exists, there would be no particular problem.  World w* could represent that object as being a philosopher by containing (or entailing) a singular proposition that includes x as a constituent (if worlds are propositions or sets of propositions), or containing a sentence that includes a name that refers to x (if they are sets of sentences), etc.  But by hypothesis, no actually existing object is possibly a child of Kant.  The problem of iterated modalities is the problem of how possible worlds represent possibilities for non-actual objects.  One natural and elegant solution is that possible worlds represent possibilities for non-actual objects in the same way they represent possibilities for actually existing objects: through singular propositions (sentences, states of affairs, etc.) that include those objects as constituents.  On this view, (1) is true in virtue of the fact that there is a world w that contains a singular proposition about an object x that says of x that it is a child of Kant and not a philosopher, and another world w* that is possible relative to w that contains a proposition about x that says that it is a philosopher.  Since by hypothesis, no actually existing object is a child of Kant or possibly a child of Kant, it follows that this object x does not actually exist.
	There are facts about counterfactual identity and non-identity for non-actual objects.  In other words, there are facts about whether the objects that would exist if a given world were actualized would also exist if a different world were actualized.  This is identical to the problem of how possible worlds represent possibilities for non-actual objects.  The most elegant solution to both problems is to posit non-actual possible objects.  But to do so is to treat existence/actuality as a determination, a predicate that applies to some but not all objects.  Therefore, there are reasons in favor of the view that existence/actuality is a determination.  To effectively undermine ontotheism and the ontological argument Kant does not need merely to show that they are committed to holding that existence is a determination; he neeeds to show why this view is false.   I now turn to his arguments for that conclusion.

6. 	The Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason

In this section I examine Kant’s arguments that existence is not a determination in the Critique of Pure Reason.  Most commentators have found these arguments both puzzling and quite unsuccessful.​[63]​  In this section I argue that the key to understanding and evaluating them is identifying their unnamed target: the possibilist ontology of non-actual possible objects.  I will begin by explaining Kant’s general argumentative strategy, and then I will analyze some key passages from the Critique in detail.  
	Although non-actual possibilia play a crucial role in the ontotheist view of divine necessity, they can do other philosophical work as well. One thing a theory of possibility needs to explain is the contents of our thoughts about non-actual possibilities.  For instance, a theory of possibility should explain what is the content of the thought there could have been objects other than those that actually exist.  On one very natural line of reasoning, in entertaining this thought I am thinking of various non-actual objects that those very objects could have been actual.  If this is the correct account of my possibility-thought, then there must be non-actual objects to be the subject-matter of that thought.   Another thing a theory of modality should explain is the truth-makers of true modal claims like there could have been objects other than those that actually exist.   On one very natural line of reasoning, what makes this claim true is that there are non-actual objects that could have been actual. In other words, the natural line of reasoning which takes my possibility-thought to be a thought about non-actual objects, and takes the truth-maker of that possibility-thought to be non-actual objects, requires an ontology that includes non-actual possibilia.  
	Kant’s strategy in key passages of the Critique is to argue that positing such an ontology does not help to account for the contents of our thoughts about non-actual possibilities or their truth-makers, because the contents and truth-makers of those thoughts are purely conceptual, and not provided by particular objects.  Kant thus intends to discredit one independent reason for positing non-actual possibilia.  Kant wants to explain the very same modal facts as the possibilist, using only actually existing objects, and concepts. Whereas the possibilist uses non-actual possible objects and their essences to account for modal facts and the contents of our modal thoughts, Kant uses only actually existing objects, and concepts.​[64]​
In the first Critique, the argument that has received the most attention from commentators is the famous ‘hundred dollars’ argument.  The first two sentences – “thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible. A hundred actual dollars contains nothing more than a hundred possible ones” (A599/B627) – are initially very puzzling, and commentators have not had much luck making sense of them.
The key to understanding Kant’s claim that actual dollars do not “contain more” than possible dollars is to realize that his target is the general ontology of non-actual possible objects, and, more specifically, the version of that ontology defended by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Several points in Kant’s argument in the first Critique only become clear when we see Baumgarten as the target. Fully elaborating Baumgarten’s possibilist ontology and Kant’s response to it lies outside the scope of this paper.  A short sketch will have to suffice.
On Baumgarten’s view, what there is divides into the actual (which Baumgarten identifies with the existent) and the merely possible (which does not exist).​[65]​  A merely possible object has all and only the properties that are contained in, or logically follow from, its essence.  However, the essences of finite objects (objects other than God) are not fully determinate; they do not determine, for every predicate A, whether the object is A or not-A.  Merely possible objects, therefore, are incompletely determinate: they have the properties contained in their essences, but are indeterminate with respect to accidental properties.   Actual objects, however, are fully determinate; for any predicate A, an actual object is either determinately A or not-A.  An actual object has, in addition to the properties contained in its essence, a fully determinate set of accidental properties.​[66]​
To return to Kant’s claim that a hundred actual dollars “contains no more” than a hundred possible dollars, we can see that he is making a point against Baumgarten: the possible is no less determinate than the actual.  But this is apt to make Kant’s claim appear only more puzzling: isn’t Kant thereby committed to there being (fully determinate) possible objects, distinct from, and in addition to, all of the (fully determinate) actual objects?  It should be clear that Kant cannot be claiming that there are non-actual possible objects that are as fully determinate as actual objects.  If he did mean this, then existence/actuality would be a determination: it would be a predicate that applies to some, but not all, objects, and hence would be a predicate that “adds to the concept” of an object. 
If Kant is not claiming that there are non-actual possible objects, what is he doing?  I think we should understand Kant’s talk of possible objects (specifically, possible dollars) here as shorthand for talk about the contents of concepts of possible objects (dollars).  When Kant writes that “a hundred actual dollars contains nothing more than a hundred possible ones” we should take him to mean: our thought of one hundred possible dollars is (at least in principle) as fully determinate in its content as one hundred actual dollars would be.  This is somewhat complicated by Kant’s (eminently reasonable) view that we cannot ever form a fully determinate concept of an individual object.  We should charitably read Kant’s claim as a conditional were: were we per impossibile able to form fully determinate concepts, our concepts of non-actual possibilities would be as determinate as actual objects are. Talk of possible objects is shorthand for talk of the contents of concepts of non-actual possibilities; insofar as our concepts of non-actual possibilities are fully determinate, so are possible objects.
This interpretation is confirmed in the next sentence: “for since the [possible dollars] signifies the concept and the [actual dollars] its object and its positing in itself, then, in case the [actual dollars] contained more than the [possible dollars], my concept would not express the entire object and thus would not be the suitable concept of it” (A599/B627).  The first part of the sentence expresses Kant’s general picture of modality: the truth-makers of modal claims about non-actual objects are general concepts, because the only objects are actual ones.   That the “possible object signifies the concept” means that talk of possible objects is shorthand for conceptually determined contents of thoughts of possibilities.  The point of the famous ‘one hundred possible dollars’ passage, therefore, is that any difference in determinacy between possibility and actuality stems from our inability to formulate completely determinate concepts of non-actual possibilities; it is not because our thoughts about non-actual possibilities are really thoughts about incompletely determinate objects.
In the second part of the sentence, Kant appears to be claiming that if my thought about some possible dollars is any less determinate than actual dollars, then my concept of those possible dollars is not “suitable” to those actual dollars, which I take to mean that my possibility-thought is not a thought about those actual dollars.   Identifying Kant’s target as the ontology of non-actual possibilia helps explain why Kant is making this point.  If I think I might have had one hundred more dollars than I actually have, but I do not conceptualize this possibility in any more determinate way (e.g. as thinking of the hundred dollars in fives, rather than twenties), even if I then find one extra hundred dollars, those actual dollars are not the possible dollars I was thinking about.   There is no sense in which the very dollars I was thinking about were made actual, because there were no particular dollars I was thinking about; I was thinking about all possible dollars.  Kant’s point is that generic concepts like dollar and hundred are sufficient to explain the content of my thought, and non-actual possible objects are doing no additional explanatory work.  After all, even on the possibilist view, what makes it the case that I was thinking about all groups of one hundred possible dollars, rather than say, all groups of one hundred possible sheep?  Presumably, the concepts I was using to think about them.  Since my thought in this case and similar cases is no more fine-grained than my concepts, there is no need to posit non-actual objects to introduce a finer grain into my thought.​[67]​
	In the remainder of the paragraph, Kant writes: “for with actuality the object is not merely included in my concept analytically, but adds synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state); yet the hundred dollars themselves that I am thinking of are not in the least increased through this being outside my concept” (A599/B627).  The point of the first half of the sentence is quite obscure.  Kant appears to be reiterating his general point against the ontotheist: no concept of a possible object, no essence, entails that its object is actual/existent.  Another point Kant might have in mind is that the (actual) objects that fall under a concept are not ‘analytically contained’ in the concept, i.e. they are not constituents of it.  What is analytically contained in a concept are its marks.  The marks of a concept determine its content (Inhalt), while the objects that fall under the concept determine its extension (Umfang).  This militates against the possibilist picture on which the content of a thought about non-actual possibilities is given by the possible objects that fall under the concept.   Kant’s point would be that the role that non-actual possible objects play in determining the contents of concepts can equally we be done by the analytical constituents (marks) of a concept, without any need for the possibilist ontology.  
	The second half of the sentence – “yet a hundred dollars themselves that I am thinking of are not in the least increased through this being outside my concept” --  reiterates Kant’s point that my thought of one hundred possible dollars is not a thought about any particular one hundred dollars.  It is a conceptually specified thought that refers indeterminately to all (groups of one hundred) possible dollars   The actual dollars are not any more ‘determinate’ than they would be if they were not actual, contra Baumgarten.  If they were not actual, they would not be at all, hence would not be determinate or indeterminate.
	The next paragraph continues Kant’s argument:
Thus, when I think a thing, through whichever and however many predicates I like (even in its thoroughgoing determination), not the least bit gets added to the thing when I posit in addition that this thing is.  For otherwise, what would exist would not be the same as what I had thought in my concept, but more than that, and I could not say that the very object of my concept exists. (A600/B628)

Initially, this should be very puzzling.  Kant has just finished arguing that there is no “more” in actual objects, than possible objects, but here he claims that if I think about a possible object, no matter how determinately, if there actually is such an object, it would not be the object I thought about, but “more” than that.  
	Kant’s point, again, is that there is no domain of merely possible objects that differ from actual objects either in being incompletely determinate (Baumgarten’s view), or in being completely determinate but merely lacking the property of actuality (a variant form of possibilism).  Kant’s reason is that if I entertain a thought about some possible object which I do not assume to be actual, even if the content of my thought is completely determinate, we cannot identify any object as the object that my thought is about.  Let’s assume I imagine the possibility of a hydrogen atom and I completely specify all of its properties.  I then find that there is a hydrogen atom with all of those properties.  Kant’s claim is that there is no sense in which that hydrogen atom was the object I was initially thinking about.  Instead of interpreting my possibility thought as being about a single object, we should interpret it as a thought about the concept hydrogen atom, a thought whose content is that there could be an object of that kind with the fully determinate set of properties specified in my thought.  The actual fully determinate hydrogen atom is not the object of my thought, because the content of my thought was not particular, but general: it was that the concept hydrogen atom could be instantiated by an object that has the fully determinate set of properties I specified.  The actual object is “more” than the content of my thought because it is an object, unlike the content of my thought, which is purely conceptual.
	To put the point of all of these Kantian arguments in contemporary terms: we cannot have singular thoughts about non-actual objects.  All of our thoughts about non-actual objects have a generic content, even if we think of a non-actual object in a completely determinate fashion, or through a definite description, as argued above.​[68]​  These thoughts would be generic, because, if there are non-actual objects, these thoughts are about an indefinitely large class of them.  Therefore, if there are non-actual objects, we never think about them individually, but only generically through concepts of them.  Kant’s point, then, is that we have no use for the ontology of non-actual possibilia; if all of our thoughts about them have a generic content, then the explanatory work done by positing such objects can equally well be done by general concepts.
	It might be objected that in these very passages Kant does appear to make singular reference to merely possible objects: “when I think a thing, through whichever and however many predicates I like (even in its thoroughgoing determination), not the least bit gets added to the thing when I post in addition that this thing is” (A600/B628, my emphasis).  But my claim is not that singular reference to possible objects is inadmissible tout court; my claim is that all apparent singular reference to possible objects (e.g. the use of the singular pronoun ‘it’ in this passage) should be understood as disguised talk about the contents of concepts of possibilities.  To take a flat-footed example, if I say ‘I am thinking of a unicorn.  It is pink’ I should not be understood to be claiming there is an object x that is a unicorn and is pink and is the object of my thought; I should instead be understood as claiming that I am having a thought whose content is given by the concepts unicorn and pink.  Similarly, I think that Kant’s claim in this passage should be glossed as:
Whenever I have a thought about some possibility (e.g. a fully determinate unicorn-thought), even if I completely determine that possibility with respect to every predicate, if it turns out that there is an object answering to my thought (e.g. a unicorn with exactly those predicates) I should not describe this situation as follows: I was thinking about that unicorn, call it x, but it turns out that in addition to the predicates I thought of x as having, x also exists. Instead, I should understand talk of ‘the unicorn’ I was thinking about as talk about the conceptual content of my unicorn-thought, and not about some object, certainly not the actually existing unicorn.

This is just the gloss I suggested in the previous paragraph, making clear that the apparent singular reference in Kant’s passage (‘it’) is precisely that: merely apparent.
	In these passages Kant gives good reasons to think that we do not need to posit non-actual objects as the subject-matter of our possibility thoughts.  But contents for possibility-thoughts are not the only role envisaged by the ontotheist for non-actual possibilia; non-actual possibilia are also supposed to provide truth-makers for those thoughts.  And, as I pointed out in the previous section, one very strong motivation for possibilism is that possibilia are truth-makers for facts about counterfactual identity and non-identity and (analogously) iterated modalities.  Recall the problem of iterated modalities, regarded by some contemporary metaphysicians as the strongest reason in favor of possibilia.  Kant could have had a child who was not a philosopher but could have been a philosopher.  More formally:
(1) 	◊x(C(x,Kant) & Px & ◊Px)
Kant’s objection to ontotheism and the ontological argument is that they are committed to holding that existence is a determination.  His arguments that existence is not a determination are only ultimately successful if his alternate, actualist conception of modality can account for the truth-conditions of (1) without positing non-actual possibilia, and thus treating existence/actuality as a determination.
	In what remains, I can only give a sketch of a Kantian solution to the problem of iterated modalities.   Given that Kant thinks that existence is not a determination, the only materials he has available to him for a solution are concepts and actually existing individuals; from these he must produce truth-conditions for (1).  It is possible for Kant to have a child because the concept child of Kant is possibly instantiated.  If Kant had a child, there would be an individual concept of that child.  That concept would be possibly co-instantiated with the concept philosopher.  In virtue of this, that child of Kant would be possibly a philosopher. Therefore, it is possible for there to be a non-philosopher child of Kant who is possibly a philosopher.
	This sketch of a Kantian solution has two notable features.  First of all, it eschews the possible worlds analysis of modality in favor of taking the truth conditions of possibility claims to consist in relations of co-instantiability among concepts.  Perhaps it could be combined with an informative analysis of that relation; if not, it has to accept this as a primitive modal notion.  However, in this respect, it is no weaker than standard possible worlds views; the only possible worlds view that even claims to offer a reductive analysis of modality is David Lewis’s modal realism, and even Lewis’s claim to reduction has been questioned.  Secondly, and more problematically, it appeals to the notion of an individual concept.  Minimally, an individual concept of an object has to be a concept that necessarily applies to that object and that object only.  Furthermore, the view needs to be supplemented with the principle that necessarily, for every object, there is an individual concept of that object.  This is problematic for two kinds of reasons. First of all, Kant does not think there can be individual concepts, only ‘particular’ uses of general concepts.  So Kant might not be able to accept this “Kantian” solution to the problem of iterated modalities.  Secondly, it isn’t clear what could make it true that necessarily for every object there is an individual concept of that object.  Perhaps it is true in virtue of the concepts object and individual concept that necessarily, for any object, there is an individual concept of that object; the concept object cannot be instantiated without the concept object of an individual concept also being instantiated.
	In conclusion, there appears to be some prospect for a solution to the problem of iterated modalities along broadly ‘Kantian’ lines, without presupposing an  ontology of possibilia.   However, fully developing such a view, and evaluating it against its possibilist rivals, lies outside the scope of this paper.

	I have argued that Kant’s claim that existence is not a determination means that existence/actuality is not a predicate that applies to some objects, and not to others; necessarily, every object exists.  ‘Existent’ does not further determine a concept in the sense of further specifying its content; ‘existent lion’ and ‘lion’ have exactly the same content, and necessarily apply to all the same objects.  This entails that there cannot be an object that necessarily exists in virtue of existence being contained in or logically entailed by its essence.  Although Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and others all offered distinctive versions of the ontological argument, they all shared a common metaphysical picture: God exists necessarily in virtue of the fact that his essence entails his existence.  Kant’s arguments that there are no non-actual objects, if successful, show that this metaphysical picture is incoherent.
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^25	  CSM 2:115, 117-118/AT 7:164, 166-7.  This point is stressed in Lawrence Nolan, “The Ontological Argument as an Exercise in Cartesian Therapy” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(2005): 521-562.
^26	  Cf. Allen Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology, 105; Jerome Shaffer, “Existence, Predication and the Ontological Argument,” 125. 
^27	  Cf. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 188.
^28	  The second conjunct is necessary to exclude impossibly instantiated concepts from being determinations; without it, every impossibly instantiated concept would be a determination.  Although it is highly counterintuitive for such concepts to be determinations, and I certainly think Kant would not accept impossibly instantiated determinations, it does not play much role in his argument.
^29	  This interpretation is confirmed by how Kant defines ‘determination’ in his discussions of the ontological argument in the lectures on rational theology.  In the Pötliz lectures, he writes: “being is thus obviously not a real predicate, that is, the concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing to make it still more complete [vollkommener]” (28:1027; cf. 28:1176).   In the Danziger lectures, he writes: “Thus I can say, the man is existent; but it does not follow from this that every logical predicate is a determination which can be added to the concept of a thing” (28:1258). 
^30	  Because for Kant, the judgment that every triangle has an internal angles that sum to two right angles is synthetic, not analytic.
^31	  The compatibility of these two claims follows from Kant’s acceptance of synthetic a priori judgments, which, by definition, are necessarily true and not analytic. See B4 and 8:235.
^32	  I have modified the Guyer/Wood translation.  In German: “Die Kategorien der Modalität haben das Besondere an sich: daß sie den Begriff, dem sie als Prädicate beigefügt werden, als Bestimmung des Objects nicht im mindesten vermehren, sondern nur das Verhältniß zum Erkenntnißvermögen ausdrücken.”  Guyer/Wood’s translation carries the unfortunate suggestion that the categories of modality are themselves determinations.  In the main text I omitted the last clause, in which Kant claims that the categories express only the relation to the faculty of cognition.  I take it that this only holds when these categories are applied to empirical objects; Kant cannot mean this for the ‘unschematized’ use of the category of existence/actuality, because that would entail that the question of whether God exists is a question of whether God is cognizable by us. The existene of empirical objects consists in their relation to our cognition; the same does not hold for non-empirical objects like God and things in themselves. Cf. 28:413, 28:554, 29:821-2.
^33	  In the initial table of the categories in the first Critique he gives ‘Dasein-Nichtsein’ as the second category of modality (A80/B106), but in the Postulates of Empirical Thought, the later section devoted to the modal categories, the second modal category is now the category of ‘Wirklichkeit’ (A218/B266).  See also Metaphysick von Schön, where Kant writes: “real actuality is here the category of existence [Existenz], in contrast to the possibility of a thing” (28:493).  See, hover, R 6324, where Kant claims that space is ‘wirklich’ but not ‘existierendes’; I take him to mean that space is actual, but not substance among others.  But note that in this sense of existence, ‘exists’ is a determination because there is at least one object that does not fall under it, space.  So this passage is not a counter-example to my interpretation; at most, it shows that Kant is sometimes willing ot use ‘existieren’ to mean express something else, namely, the property of being a causally interacting spatiotemporal object among others (rather than the form which makes those objects possible, space and, presumably, time).
^34	  Readers familiar with German might wonder about the relation between my use of ‘object’ and the two German words Kant uses: ‘Objekt’, and ‘Gegenstand.’  Some readers have deteced an important difference in the meanings of these terms in Kant’s philosophy; the locus classicus of the Objekt/Gegenstand distinction is the first edition of Henry Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 135-6.  Allison used that distinction primarily to analyze the argument of the Transcendental Deduction.  However, the argument I’m discussing first occurs in Kant’s 1763 Only Possible Ground, and thus predates any Critical distinction (if there is one) between Objekt and Gegenstand.  Furthermore, in the relevant section of the first Critique, “On the impossibility of an ontological proof of the existence of God” (A592/B620-A602/B632), Kant uses the following terms apparently interchangeably: Ding, Wesen, Objekt, Gegenstand.  I take it, therefore, that the argument operates with a very general notion of ‘object’ and that is the notion of object I am discussing in the body of the paper.
^35	  However, there are passages in which Kant uses the term ‘Bestimmung’ in a way that appears incompatible with my interpretation.  For instance, in the “Discipline of Pure Reason” section Kant writes: “the common definition of the circle, that it is a curved line all of whose points are the same distance from a single middle point, makes the mistake of unnecessarily including the determination curved” (A732/B760).  If Kant is claiming here that curved is a determination of the concept circle then he is either using ‘determination’ in a different sense than at A598/B626 (and other passages where he defines ‘determination’ similarly), my interpretation of the A598/B626 definition is wrong, or he is here claiming, absurdly, that it is possible that there is a circle that is not curved. I think that Kant is using ‘determination’ in a different sense in this passage, and in several other passages.   If Kant here means determination in the sense of a predicate that “enlarges a concept” (the sense whose definition is in question in the body of the paper) what could he have in mind here? Since it is impossible for there to be a non-curved circle, the only sense in which ‘curved’ “adds something to the concept ‘circle’ is that it is not analytically contained in the concept ‘circle’ when circle is properly defined.  But then, by ‘determination’ Kant would simply mean ‘synthetic predicate,’ and we have seen that the synthetic predicate reading of ‘determination’ is untenable.  This strongly suggests that whatever ‘determination’ means here, it does not mean a predicate that “enlarges a concept” in the A598/B626 sense.  In fact, in context, Kant’s point seems merely that the predicate curved should not be included in the definition of circle because one can prove from the definition of a circle (properly formulated) that it is curved; Kant’s point would be made just as well if ‘determination’ just meant ‘predicate.’ Indeed, there was excellent historical precedent for Kant to use ‘determination’ to mean merely ‘predicate.’ In Metaphysica §29-31 Baumgarten describes what it is to be determinate (determinatur) and then goes on to define what it is to be a determination (determinatio).  In Baumgarten’s terminology, to predicate anything of a subject is to determine the subject, to posit it as determinate with respect to that predicate.  The predicate that is predicated of the subject is a determination of the subject.   For Baumgarten, ‘determinatio’ is a perfectly general term that applies to any predicate of any possible subject. In Baumgarten’s terminology, it would be incoherent to deny that existence is a determination, for to say that existence is a determination is just to say that existence can be a predicate in judgments.  This cannot be the sense in which Kant means ‘determination’ when he denies that existence is a determination.  But it makes perfect sense of Kant’s claim that curved is a determination of circles, and numerous other passages that pose a prima facie challenge to my interpretation.  I propose the following criterion, therefore, for determining whether, in a given passage, Kant means ‘determination’ in the technical sense defind at A598/B626, or whether he means it merely in Baumgarten’s sense to refer to any predicate whatsoever: if reading ‘determination’ to mean ‘predicate’ is sufficient to make Kant’s point, then in that passage he has Baumgarten’s notion of determination (=predicate) in mind.  Otherwise, he has the technical sense in mind.  In particular, in contexts relevant to Kant’s theory of modality, existence, and his objections to the ontological argument, ‘determination’ will be used in the technical sense defined at A598/B626, because the mere notion of ‘predicate’ would be insufficient to make Kant’s point.  For instance, when Kant claims at A276/B332 that space and time are determinations of appearances but not of things in themslves, it is clear (I think) that Kant’s point is merely that appearances are in space and time, while things in themselves are not; the predicates ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ apply to appearances, but not to things in themselves.  So ‘determination’ in this passage does not have the technical sense of a predicate that “enlarges a concept” (A598/B626); here it merely means ‘predicate.’  I think all of the other passages that pose a prima facie challenge to my interpretation can be handled similarly. Cf. A493/B522, in which Kant claims that space and time are ‘determinations’ of our sensibility. 
^36	  I use the term ‘counterfactual situation’ rather than the more loaded term ‘possible world’ because I do not want to give the (mistaken) impression that I am attributing a possible worlds analysis of modality to Kant or to this ontotheist opponents.  I am using the notion of a counterfactual situation merely as a heuristic; I am not claiming that for Kant, or his opponents, counterfactual situations enter into the truth-makers of modal claims.  The relation between counterfactual situations and necessity is the following: ☐p if and only if for any possible counterfactual situation q, if it were the case that q it would be the case that p.  This is obviously not a reductive account of necessity because the right-hand of the bi-conditional appeals to the notion of a ‘possible counterfactual situation.’ It is merely a heuristic for evaluating modal claims.
^37	  In line with the heuristic of the previous note, we can say: if God had not created the actual world, Caesar might not exist, or might exist but not be Greek.  But no matter what world God created, Caesar would be self-identical and human.  Thus, existence and being Greek are accidents of Caesar; being self-identical and human are essential properties of Caesar.
^38	  Cf. Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality” Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 8: Logic and Language, 1-16 at 3-4.  As I understand Fine’s argument, he comes to the same conclusion: that idea some being exists in virtue of facts about its essence is committed to the idea that there are non-existent objects.
^39	  E.g. David Lewis is a possibilist par excellence, but has no truck with the neo-Meinongian view that there are non-existent objects.   See On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), second edition, 97-98.
^40	  See 1:396, 2:72, 2:75, 28:1151, 28:1256, 28:1291. Interestingly, at 29:986 Kant explicitly distinguishes actuality from existence, writing: “one cannot hereby equate the concept of actuality with the concept of existence, for the existence of a thing comprehends in itself the possibility as well as the actuality, as the necessity of an object, whereby existence is predicated of all three, but actuality of actuality alone” (29:987).  I find this remark deeply obscure; however, the evidence shows that Kant himself does not respect this distinction – whatever it is supposed to be -- in his other writings.
^41	  The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. and ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch [CSM] (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985), vol. 2, 83.  I have inserted the premise numbers and the line spacing; Descartes presents the argument in continuous prose.
^42	  My interpretation of Descartes’ ontological argument as admitting non-existent objects follows the general lines of Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), ch. 7.  More recently, some scholars have raised questions about this ‘Meinongian’ reading of Descartes; see especially Lawrence Nolan, “The Ontological Argument as an Exercise in Cartesian Therapy” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(2005): 521-562 and “The Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78(1997): 169-194; and David Cunning, David, "Descartes' Modal Metaphysics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  Neither Nolan nor Cunning notice that, unless Descartes is willing to admit at least the epistemic possibility in the Fifth Meditation that there are objects that do not actually exist yet have essences, the argument of the Fifth Meditation is immediately question-begging.  Nolan shows convincingly that part of the role of the ontological argument of the Fifth Meditation is to help the meditator free himself from intellectual prejudices and attain a clear insight into God’s essence and existence (and their identity); a question-begging argument may be able to do this just as well as one that does not beg a question. However, in the Replies Descartes goes to great lengths to defend the argument as an argument against Caterus, Gassendi and others.    It is hard to see why he would do this if the argument is as immediately question-begging as it must be if there are only actually existing objects (so that in admitting that God has an essence, the meditator is already admitting that God actually exists).
^43	  “Possible existence is contained in the concept or idea of everything that we clearly and distinctly understand” (CSM 2:83/AT 7:116).
^44	  Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. and ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber [AG] (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 25. 
^45	  For Leibniz’s proof that God is possible, see Leibniz, Philospohical Papers and Letters [L], ed. and trans. Leroy Loemker (Dordrect: Kluwer, 1989), second reprinting, 167-8; cf. Adams, Leibniz, 142-148.
^46	  This an instance of the Barcan formula; See Ruth Barcan, “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 11: 1–16.
^47	  Strictly speaking, the claim that existence is a quantifier should be distinguished from the claim that quantifiers are second-order concepts.   Frege held both views, but Quine held only the former.  For Quine ‘xGod(x)’ means that there is a God, and is not existentially committed to concepts.  However, since the issue of whether existence claims commit us to the existence of concepts is not germane to Kant’s objection to the ontological argument, and in the passages quoted Kant offers the Fregean analysis, in the rest of the paper I assume that quantifiers are second-order concepts.  Frege himself believed that the quantificational theory of existence shows that the ontological argument fails: “affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but a denialof the number nought.  Because existence is a property of concepts, the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down” (Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1986), p. 65.
^48	  See James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: Oxford 1999), 191-2  for a similar presentation of this objection.
^49	  The sentence from Only Possible Ground comes from this passage: “But when existence occurs as a predicate in common speech, it is a predicate not so much of the thing itself as of the thought which one has of the thing.  For example: existence belongs to the sea-unicorn (or narwal) but not to the land-unicorn.  This simply means: the representation of a sea-unicorn (or narwal) is an empirical concept; in other words, it is the representation of an existent thing . . . The expression ‘A sea-unicorn (or narwal) is an existent animal’ is not, therefore, entirely correct.  The expression ought to be formulated the other way round to read ‘The predicates, which I think collectively when I think of a sea-unicorn or narwal attach to a certain existent sea-animal’” (2:72-3).  I think it is clear that Kant here anticipates Frege’s idea that ‘exists’ is a predicate that applies to concepts. For an alernate view, however, see Timothy Rosenkoetter, “Absolute Positing, the Frege Anticipation Thesis, and Kant's Definitions of Judgment” European Journal of Philosophy 18 (December 2010), 539-566.
^50	  They can then give an analysis of the first-order predicate ‘possible’ -- Possible (x) = def  Ey(x=y) -- and an analysis of the first-order predicate ‘merely possible’ -- Merely possible (x) =def y(x=y) & Ey(x=y).
^51	  AT 4:349, where Descartes claims there is only a rational distinction between the essence and existence of a substance. 
^52	  For the actualist strand in Leibniz’s thought, see Benson Mates The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 10; cf. Adams, Leibniz, ch. 6.  There are some texts in which Leibniz appears to appreciate precisely the point Kant makes in the Critique of Pure Reason when he writes: “If I cancel the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, then a contradiction arises; hence I say that the former necessarily pertains to the latter.  But if I cancel the subject together with the predicate, then no contradiction arises; for there is no longer anything that could be contradicted.  To posit a triangle and cancel its three angles is contradictory; but to cancel the triangle together with its three angles is not a contradiction” (A595/B622).  In one passage, Leibniz makes the same point: it is not that all triangles have three sides, whether or not they exist, but that necessarily if there exists a triangle, it has three sides (quoted on p. 162).  However, in that very passage, Leibniz fails to draw the conclusion that the claim that God exists in virtue of his essence reduces to the triviality that necessarily God exists if he exists.  Adams follows Mates in interpreting Leibniz as being an actualist; all claims about non-actual objects, on this reading, are reducible to claims about inferential relations among concepts.  However, what Adams fails to point out is that this entails that the ontological argument, as conceived by Kant, is impossible.  It may be that Leibniz was the first to make Kant’s discovery about the ontological argument.
^53	  Whether the standard Kripke semantics commits one to non-actual possibilia is a long-standing debate in contemporary metaphysics; see John Divers, Possible Worlds (New York: Routledge, 2002), ch. 13 for a survey of that debate.
^54	  For an influential possible worlds view that is also thoroughly actualist, see Robert Adams, “Theories of Actuality” reprinted in Michael Loux, ed. The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 197), 190-209. 
^55	  The same point could be made by pointing out that God’s thoughts about non-actual objects are intensional.  However, for the sake of the parallel with possible worlds semantics, in the body of the paper I focus on the idea that God’s thoughts about possibilia might be generic rather than singular.
^56	  In this section I am drawing a parallel between eighteenth century theories of possible worlds and contemporary possible worlds accounts of modality.  However, I am not claiming that any of these eighteenth century figures in question (Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, etc.) endorsed a possible worlds analysis of modality.  For each of these thinkers, facts about which states of affairs are possible are grounded in facts about which states of affairs are internally logically consistent, not in facts about what is true at various possible worlds.  However, insofar as they share the picture of God choosing among possible worlds, there is a parallel between their views and contemporary views on which possibility is analyzed in terms of truth at a possible world. But it is merely that: a parallel.
^57	  Leibniz, Theodicy, 370-1.
^58	  Rather than the existentially-comitting quantiifer, as in the previous section.
^59	  There is a long and sophisticated literature on this issue.  See especially Leibniz, Adams, ch. 2 &3; Robert Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Fabrizio Mondadori, “Understanding Superessentialism.” Studia Leibnitiana XVII (1985), 162–190; Margaret Wilson, “Possible Gods.” Review of Metaphysics 32 (1978/9), 717–33; Ohad Nachtomy, Possibility, Agency, and Individuality in Leibniz's Metaphysics (Dordrecht: Springer, 1997); Stefano Di Bella The Science of the Individual (Dordrect: Kluwer, 2005).
^60	  I don’t mean to be denying that facts about counterfactual (non)identity of individuals can be grounded in facts about God’s ideas, for Leibniz.  I think they are; in fact, I think, for Leibniz, counterfactual identity, if it were possible, would be grounded in relations of similarity in content between God’s ideas of individuals at different worlds and it is because no such relations of similiarity can ground identity without leading to absurdities that Leibniz denies counterfactual identity.  My point in the body of the paper is simply that Leibniz, given his commitment to a very strong form of the principle of sufficient reason, would not want to hold that it is a brute fact that God thinks about x in world w and y in world w* (where these worlds are distinct) as distinct individuals; there has to be something about x, y or God’s ideas of them that ground this difference.
^61	  I don’t think either Adams or Sleigh adequately explains why Leibniz holds counterfactual non-identity.  However, my reasons lie far outside the scope of this paper. 
^62	  This problem was first clearly formulated by Alan McMichael in “A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983), 49-66.
^63	  Wood reconstructs this argument in Kant’s Rational Theology, 108-9; by his own admission, though, the argument, as reconstructed by Wood, is a complete failure.  Cf. Jerome Shaffer, “Existence, Predication and the Ontological Argument,” 126.  While Van Cleve does think Kant delivers an effective objection to the ontological argument, he does not think the “one hundred dollars” argument is part of that objection; see Problems from Kant, 197-192.  Nor does Plantinga find in Kant a plausible, valid argument that makes a relevant point agains the ontological argument; see “Kant’s Objection to the Ontological Argument” The Journal of Philosophy 63(19): 537-546. 
^64	  What Kant takes to be the truth-maker of claims like the concept ‘dollar possessed by me but distinct from the dollars I actually possess’ is possibly instantiated lies outside the scope of this paper; my point is just that Kant’s account of the truth-makers of modal claims like this one do not involve non-actual possible objects.  For more on Kant’s positive views on modality, see my “Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori?” Noûs 45:3 (2011), 443–471.
^65	  Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §7-9, 40-41.
^66	  Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §41, 48-50.
^67	  For instance, if I were able to think about a particular non-actual possibile and this could not be accounted for in terms of the conceptual content of my thought (perhaps because there is a plurality of conceptually indistinguishable possibile), then that would constitute a reason for positing these objects.  But that is precisely what Kant (quite reasonably) claims we cannot do: make singular reference to possibile.
^68	  Cf. Quine on “the possible bald man in that doorway” in “On What There Is” From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 1-19 at 4.
